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Philosophers as well as regular folks throughout history have expressed views that we 
should at least somewhat pay attention to how we treat animals. If not for the sake of animals, 
then at least for anthropocentric reasons. However, it is becoming increasingly more accepted 
that we also should pay attention to how animals are being treated because of animals 
themselves, and not just for the sake of humans. That is to say that animals matter morally. 
Animals themselves can be wronged. Some would say that the inherent value would grant 
animals the right not to be inflicted unnecessary harm on them. Yet some would also go as far 
as to say that the act of killing an animal also harms and therefore wrongs the animal. This latter 
view is the predominant abolitionist animal rights view which will be the focus of my thesis. 
Philosophers dating as far back as ancient Greece with Porphyry1 have expressed doubts 
about the ethics of killing nonhuman animals for non-essential reasons, i.e. reasons that have 
nothing to do with the survival of humans. However, those concerns were few and far between. 
Only in the past four decades or so has there been a major incline in the interest in nonhuman 
animal lives in the academia as well as outside of it. Indeed, the fact that animals have the 
ability to feel pain and pleasure is not a controversial claim anymore. Times have moved past 
the French philosopher René Descartes’ claim that nonhuman animals are mere machines 
without sentiency. Still, whilst most would agree that we should not inflict unnecessary harm 
or suffering on animals, the killing aspect is more contentious. Moreover, as a society, we rely 
rather heavily on using animals in ways that involves killing them. We rely on animal bodies 
for material to put together various products. We rely on animals for entertainment and culture 
(bullfighting, horseraces), for education2 (zoos), for our food, commonly three times per day, 
every day. We use animals in ways that go unquestioned and even unnoticed by us. Following 
the rights framework, we would have to get rid of most if not all practices involving the use of 
animals. My thesis is not concerned with every use of ours when it comes to animals. Rather I 
want to mostly focus on area that we are in contact with on a daily basis: food. There are a few 
reasons for me focusing on this. First, the animal agriculture industry is without a doubt the 
 
1 For example: Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals 1.8, trans. Gillian Clark 
(London: Duckworth, 2000), translation first published 1823, expressing views on the cruelty 
of killing and eating animals when there is no need for it. 
2 Although it is questionable how much we really learn about the animals if the environment 
they are in is not a natural one and therefore their natural behaviour will be limited. 
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industry that uses animals in the greatest numbers. Tens of billions of animals are killed 
annually in animal agriculture. Yet, secondly, eating animals is non-essential for humans. That 
is to say it belongs to practices that benefit humans in some ways, but without which humans 
could very well thrive, not to mention survive3. We do not need to consume animal products. 
Eating as such and getting relevant nutrients is of course essential for our survival. But eating 
animals and animal products is interchangeable for vegan foods. For example, eating a burger 
out of habit, tradition or pleasure can be switched to a vegan burger, a plant-based alternative 
that is even potentially healthier and just as tasty. If a reason for the use is a non-essential one, 
it is easier to argue against it. Third, even though animal products are nonessential for most of 
us, it is not perceived as such. For example, the use of fur is more easily regarded as a non-
essential luxury good. Clothing generally is essential for us as well. We need protection from 
harsh weather conditions. But most of our clothes are not animal derived anyways, so fur is 
more easily seen as nonessential4. In comparison, the majority of the common Western diet 
consists of animal products. Even given that humans can thrive without eating animal products, 
the majority does not want to and still regards eating animal products more as a necessity over 
other uses of animals. Of course, there exists a multitude of reasons as to why people keep 
eating animals but discussing those goes beyond the scope of this thesis.  
As it currently stands, a society where eating animals and their by-products is not a 
norm can seem utopic. There have been several criticisms made towards animal ethics, claiming 
that it has become too abstract, too detached from the real world and people's actual abilities5. 
What the critics have in mind is that it is difficult to follow the claims that ethics makes. On the 
 
3 A vegan diet is appropriate to the nutrient needs of humans and can even offer benefits in 
comparison to a diet consisting of meat and dairy as well as plants. 
https://www.vrg.org/nutrition/2009_ADA_position_paper.pdf 
4 There has also been major campaigning and work done to inform the public about the harsh 
conditions of the animals in the fur industry that are responsible for this shift, as fur did not 
used to be perceived problematically.  
5 Garner, Robert (2016). Welfare, Rights, and Non-Ideal Theory. In: The ethics of killing 
animals. (ed. Višak, Tatjana). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
, T.J. Kasperbauer, Subhuman: The Moral Psychology of Human Attitudes to Animals, Oxford 
University Press, 2018, Garner 2016 
A similar charge has been directed at ethics overall, see Appiah, K.A. 2008 and Anscombe, G. 
E. M. "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 1-19. Accessed February 
20, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749051.  
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one hand it might seem obvious that ethics should not be bound by what alone is easy. Ethical 
requirements should be demanding. But on the other hand, if ethical requirements are too 
farfetched, there seems to be a problem. Animal ethics, being practical ethics, should after all 
be practical. This leads us to question whether veganism should be an ethical requirement, or 
whether we need something less demanding. This is what I examine in the second chapter of 
my thesis, after introducing and defending the abolitionist animal rights framework and 
veganism in the first chapter. I will defend veganism as an ethical requirement, as ethical 
requirements sometimes need to be demanding, depending on the current state of the world. I 
will also point out how demanding ethical requirement can still have practical value, for 
example by providing an ideal. One important goal of ethics arguably is to assist moral progress. 
In order for moral progress to happen (or for moral decline to not happen), we need to have 
decent ethical requirements, even if it takes a long time to achieve them or if they are not 100% 
achievable. Abolitionist animal rights position is therefore not too impractical. 
However, veganism can still be seen as a demanding ethical requirement, because of the 
current state of the world, which is far from satisfying the claim. Political theorist and animal 
ethicist Robert Garner has proposed that “a solution to the discrepancy between the abstract 
theorizing of animal ethicists and the reality of animal use and killing in the modern world 
might lie in the application of nonideal theory.“ (2016, 220) Inspired by Garner, I will suggest 
that it can be useful to introduce the nonideal realm into animal ethics. For nonideal theory, we 
first need the ideal theory, which as mentioned, is what the first chapter of my thesis is 
concerned with. But I will elaborate on the terminology of ideal and nonideal in the third 
chapter. I will also explain how my ideal theory differs from Garner’s ideal theory, as Garner 
does not see fault in the killing aspect of animals per se. Moreover, his interpretation of the 
nonideal theory differs from mine as well. He, in a Rawlsian fashion, puts priority for the most 
urgent issue that concerns our use of animals – the suffering. This, however, will make his 
nonideal theory to be too undemanding for proving individual guidance. I will argue in favour 
of a nonideal realm in animal ethics that involves the notion of secondary requirements. Put in 
very simple terms, secondary requirements are based on the idea, if you can’t do it fully, do it 
a little bit, at least. This idea is based on Tobias Leenart’s (2017) pragmatic approach to vegan 
activism. The idea is simple, yet it lacks a theoretical standing in the realm of moral philosophy. 
It can be thought of as a nonideal approach to ethics, as first order requirements are ideal and 
second order ethical requirements less than ideal, but still, ideally, guiding us towards the ideal. 
Therefore, I will argue that we should introduce the notion of secondary requirements as per 
nonideal theory in Rawlsian terms.  
 6 
In order to make sense of the secondary requirements and to assess which ones we ought to do 
more, I will introduce a scalar way of evaluating people’s actions. It will also assist us when 
we want to talk about moral progress in our society. What I hope to have achieve in this thesis 
is a theory that allows us to assess the goodness and wrongness of our actions on a wider scale 
rather than merely ‘wrong’ or ‘right’, whilst keeping the notions of ‘wrong’ and ‘right’. It is 
optimific under nonideal circumstances on our way to an ideal world to have scalar way of 
thinking about morality in addition to the notions ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. In order for positive 
moral progress to happen more quickly and in order for us to be able to assess moral progress 
better, secondary moral requirements that follow from first-order moral requirements can be of 
use. First-order moral requirements are what ethics requires us. Secondary moral requirements 
are requirements that arise when we fail to follow first-order moral requirements. Whilst my 
focus is on animal rights and what those demands from us - veganism – the ideal and nonideal 
approach could be relevant in other areas of ethics as well6.  
A scalar way of assessing wrongness is usually considered to be utilitarian. However, I 
am arguing that it also goes together with deontological abolitionist animal rights theory. At 
first glance, in a deontological approach such as abolitionist animal rights approach, actions are 
more easily seen either wrong or right, whereas in scalar utilitarianism there is a wider scale 
rather than just ‘wrong’ or ‘right’. However, I want to keep the ideal and the ‘wrong’ in addition 
to having a scalar approach to wrongness. Actions can be more or less wrong, instead of just 















6 It has been applied somewhat to the issue of climate change, but as it currently stands, it is 
still not a common approach, e.g. López, Eduardo Rivera. (2017). Nonideal Ethics. In: The 
International Encyclopedia of Ethics.  
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Chapter 1: The abolitionist animal rights framework 
In this chapter I am introducing and defending the animal rights framework insofar as 
is relevant to my thesis, as well as introducing its alternative framework – welfarism. I will start 
with the latter, as my main focus is on the former.   
 
1.1 Welfarist “animal rights”  
Most people as well as philosophers generally agree that for one reason or another, be 
it anthropocentric or not, we have to pay at least some attention to how we are treating non-
human animals.7 This is in accordance with the welfarist approach to animal ethics, which is 
the view, according to which animals’ welfare matters morally. We have a responsibility to 
animals to provide at least minimal care for them, although there is nothing wrong with using 
animals per se. Only unnecessary harms to animals are not accepted. However, what counts as 
“unnecessary” is rather ambiguous. Most of the time, the collective interests of humans 
outweigh animals’ interests, so almost anything could be deemed as “necessary”. For example, 
intensive animal farming is usually deemed necessary, although as mentioned earlier, humans 
do not need animal products to flourish8.  
Welfarism can be extended into new welfarism9. The position is held most prominently by a 
political philosopher Robert Garner. New welfarists, as welfarists, are concerned with animal 
welfare. However, they differ from welfarists as they sometimes see fault in using animals for 
the interests of humans. Ideally only very important human interest could outweigh strong 
animal interests, as an interest to continue living (Garner 2016, 225). However, Garner focuses 
on the nonideal part, where what matter is whether animals suffer or not, and not whether 
animals are used or not. I will come back to this more specifically in chapter 3, where I elaborate 




7For U.S statistics concerning the public’s opinion on welfare of animals: 
https://www.humanesociety.org/sites/default/files/docs/ballot-initiatives-chart.pdf (as of 
5.02.2021). Public opinion is against fur farming in majority of European countries, in addition 
to U.S. and Canada:https://www.furfreealliance.com/public-opinion/  Public opinion in EU 
countries regarding the welfare of animals: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_270_en.pdf  
8 https://www.vrg.org/nutrition/2009_ADA_position_paper.pdf  
9 Also called ’animal protectionism’ 
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1.2 Abolitionist animal rights 
According to Tom Regan, the philosopher most associated with the topic of animal 
rights, the animal rights position is “abolitionist in its aspirations. It seeks not to reform how 
animals are exploited, making what we do to them more humane, but to abolish their 
exploitation. To end it. Completely.“ (Cohen and Regan 2001, 127) 
 
Now I will introduce the other framework, according to which we should not only pay 
attention to the way how animals are used. Rather we should pay attention that it is wrong that 
animals are used at all. This is called the abolitionist animal rights framework. The term ‘animal 
rights’ has some ambiguity to it. What do I mean by ‘animal rights’? It is possible to distinguish 
between a moral right and a legal right. (Regan 1983, 267, 268) Many moral rights of animals 
are not recognized by most people as well as philosophers, so there is a very important 
normative element. When talking about moral rights of animals, it often means arguing for the 
recognition of the moral rights of animals. When we talk about legal rights, however, we might 
talk about the few legal rights that some animals have. However, more commonly, we talk about 
legal rights that animals should possess in virtue of existing, but do not yet possess. The 
principle or we could also say ‘moral right’ that is most accepted in animal ethics is that humans 
should not inflict unnecessary suffering on animals (Abbate 2019, 557). This is one of the key 
notions of the welfarism framework, which sets the welfare of the animal to be the central issue. 
How the abolitionist differs from the new welfarist account is that new welfarists such 
as Garner holds that we should prioritize the suffering on animals, not abolishing the killing of 
animals. How abolitionist animal rights framework differs from welfarist account is that the 
abolitionist is also concerned with the lives of animals, not just the welfare. The abolitionist 
recognizes that killing an animal wrongs them, as killing removes the chance from the animal 
to continue on living and experiencing positive things10. So, there is no justifiable reason for 
killing animals for human interests such as food. We should not inflict suffering on animals 
unless it benefits them, and we should not kill them. Similarly, we should not support industries 
that kill and/or inflict harm on animals for nonessential reasons, i.e. we should be vegan11. 
Using animals purely as means always harms them. We cannot use animals purely as means 
and not harm them. This is especially true of widescale industries where the focus is on making 
profit and not on providing the animal’s welfare. Welfare is usually only provided insofar as it 
 
10 I have talked more about this in my bachelor thesis: Erik, Egle. 2018 “How the virtue of 
compassion requires us to be vegan.” BA thesis. University of Tartu 
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is beneficial to the owner of the animal. In almost all cases where we acquire animal products, 
animals have been used purely as means. Therefore, we will wrong animals, if we support an 
industry or action that has used an animal purely as means12.  
When talking about moral rights, we are talking about rights that animals possess in 
virtue of existing. According to Tom Regan, being a subject-of-life, that is being someone rather 
than something grants one moral rights. Most commonly agreed by philosophers and non-
philosophers alike, whether that be in these terms or some other, animals have a moral right not 
be inflicted unnecessary suffering upon them. The term ‘unnecessary’ is ambiguous. The 
general idea is, however, that the benefit has to be worth the sacrifice. For example, it is 
“necessary” in an experiment to hurt an animal in order to find out how much pain they can 
handle. However, if the objective of the experiment is not important, or important enough to 
justify the means, which in this example, it surely is not, the experiment itself can be deemed 
unnecessary (Francione 1996, 24, Abbate 2019, 557). 
There are many reasons why we might inflict suffering upon nonhuman animals. First 
of all, it might be for the benefit of the animal. For example, we might have a veterinarian inject 
a vaccine to a dog. It might be unpleasant for the dog in that moment, but it will be beneficial 
in the long run, as the vaccination will provide them protection from disease or illness. Second 
reason for inflicting suffering on animals is for the benefit of humans. The benefit can either be 
non-essential or essential. Entertainment and various cultural reasons that might be important 
for humans but can be replaced can be put to the category ‘non-essential’. The second category, 
‘essential’, here some animal experimentation might possibly fall under. However, the majority 
of experiments do not serve any important human interest. But if some experimentation could 
possibly serve a major human interest that is crucial, this could be seen as more important than 
the entertainment reasons. Even so the possible benefit to humans might not be enough to justify 
harming animals. However, that issue might be more complex than I wish to undertake here. 
Why should we care about animals? The fact that they are alive is not enough for moral 
consideration. Plants are alive, bacteria are alive, cancerous cells are alive (Regan 1983, 130, 
152). Tom Regan has introduced the term ‘subject-of-a-life’ to illustrate sufficient conditions 
for a nonhuman animal (or anyone or thing for that matter) to quality as a moral patient. The 
conditions are the following:  
The individual must have: 
 
12 Maybe in some cases backyard chickens are kept well, not killed prematurely and their eggs 
are consumed by humans, as the chickens did not want the eggs. But those cases are quite rare, 
so I do not think it matters here.  
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“1) beliefs and desires;  
2) perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future;  
3) an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain;  
4) preference- and welfare-interests;  
5) the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals;  
6) a psychophysical identity over time;  
7) and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiental life fares well or ill for them, 
logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the 
object of anyone else's interests.” 
 
„Those who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value—
inherent value—and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles.“ (ibid 243) Animals 
that have some but not all of the fore-mentioned criteria can nevertheless be owed moral regard 
due to harm and ‘respect principles. These conditions serve to illustrate why animals should be 
considered morally. But he has left it an open question whether these conditions are also 
necessary for a being to count as a moral patient (ibid 153, 264). Certainly, we share some of 
these things with nonhuman animals, but many of those are hard to measure, taking into 
consideration we do not share the same language with animals. Moreover, so many different 
species exist, some more similar to humans, some less.  
I think that sentiency is the thing that matters when taking into account how we should 
talk about the treatment of animals. Animals certainly can be observed to have their own 
individuality, some more, some less, and it should be somewhat taken into consideration, but 
as it currently stands, we do not have accurate means available to us to properly assess the 
cognitive abilities of animals. When we harm a sentient being, it matters morally. Whereas 
when we harm a non-sentient being, it is harder to argue that it matters morally. We can have 
special reasons for providing moral rights for for example trees, but it is not the case that every 
tree matters morally and we harm the tree in a morally significant way, as the tree does not 
possess the ability to feel pain. This is why I do not think the abovementioned criteria for being 
a subject-of-a-life is not necessary for arguing that animals should not be viewed or treated as 
mere receptacles. Animals have interests in a way plants or inanimate object do not. Animals 
and nonhuman animals are sentient and alive, which why their interests and whether we hinder 
them matters (ibid 100). 
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Whilst I think there are benefits to talking about animals without the rights terminology, 
we need the rights terminology too. It enables us to emphasize that, as Regan has phrased it “it 
is not an act of kindness to treat animals respectfully. It is an act of justice.” (ibid 280) Rights 
are often associated with reciprocity. If I have a right for something, then I also have a 
responsibility. However, this can be contested by drawing a distinction between a moral patient 
and a moral agent. Moral agents can be held responsible for their actions and expected to act 
morally. Moral patients on the other hand lack the ability to reason in the concrete way moral 
agents do not, and therefore are not expected to act morally. However, moral patients should 
still be treated morally by moral agents (Regan 1984, 151-152). 
The animal rights framework is a theory as well as a social movement associated with 
veganism, the practice of and belief in abstaining from animal products and choosing plant-
based products instead. For my purposes, both the theory as well as the social movement will 
be important. In fact, the way an individual can implement the ideas about animal rights into 
their everyday life, is predominantly through veganism. Animal ethics is an area in practical 
philosophy, belonging to moral as well as to political philosophy. Sometimes the two are 
differentiated, but it is not so easy to draw the line. Political philosophy to some degree should 
be more concerned with the practical side of reasoning, whilst ethics can be more idealistic. 
However, this is not always so. When we are talking about how we should treat animals, the 
moral and the political spheres are and have always been connected (Cochrane et al. 2016). 
This thesis is, therefore, also concerned with the moral as well as with the political. At the same 
time, I will be mostly focused on the obligations of the individual in their day-to-day life, as 
this is what ethics is primarily concerned with – the guidance of the individual.  
Additionally, when talking about a moral or political theory, it can be useful to pay 
attention to the different aspects of the theory by categorising them in the following way:  the 
ideal, the micro and the macro component (Francione 1996, 150). First, the ideal describes the 
state of affairs the moral theory seeks to achieve. Secondly, the micro component regards the 
individual and what the individual should do. Third, the macro component regards the society 
and “addresses obligation on the macro level and prescribes what, if anything, a social 
movement should seek to do on a social, political, or legal level to implement the moral ideals 
in the society generally, through, for example, education or legislation intended to change social 
institutions that support animal exploitation.” (Ibid 150) I think it is quite important to 
differentiate between the micro and macro level. In animal ethics, questions regarding how we 
ought to treat animals are moral as well as political. This distinction is often glanced over. 
Whilst it is difficult to see the direct lines, I think it is illuminating to consider these taking into 
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account the categorisation by Francione. I will explain it later on, by explaining how Robert 
Garner seems to be more concerned with the macro level, but how it is important to keep in 
mind the micro component as well, as that is what is of major importance in animal ethics. In 
the case of using animals for food, an individual could stop purchasing meat and/or killing 
animals for food and eat plant-based alternatives more easily, whereas, it can be harder to push 
for laws that make killing animals for food illegal, as the practice is literally as old as 
humankind. The moral sphere can be connected to the individual guidance, whereas the societal 
and political aspect might allow more compromise.  The ideal component of the animal rights 
theory is that animals will no longer be used purely as means. On the micro level, individuals 
should not kill animals for their own benefit, disregarding the individual animal, as well as not 
purchase foods that consist of animals or their by-products. That is to not support practices that 
use animals purely as means, disregarding the animal as living being. On the macro level, laws 
should be passed that will lead to the ideal, which is that no animal will be used purely as means. 
In practical terms, it can be difficult to determine which laws exactly do that. Nonetheless, it is 
important for there to be an ideal for both the individual and the society.  
One might still ask, if there is no practical consequence of the action, is it really wrong 
to support an act that was already done, e.g. buy or eat meat that came from an animal that was 
already killed.  Even though it can be hard for an individual to make a difference, it is still 
possible. Whilst animal parts in the supermarket shelves belong to animals who are already 
dead and the animal in the supermarket or on someone’s plate cannot be brought back to life. 
It does not follow that we should just continue on eating and buying meat. First, there might be 
a way to make change happen. Secondly, even if change is difficult to come about, taking part 
or supporting a harmful act is still wrong in itself. It is true that the dead animals will not turn 
undead no matter what we do. However, is it possible to prevent new animals from being 
slaughtered to satisfy the demand for meat? There has to be a way to influence the meat 
industry. Businesses depend on their customers. Whilst the meat industry will not stop merely 
because one person decides to stop eating meat, collectively individuals can have an impact on 
the industry. Alastair Norcross (2014) has illustrated this in the following way. With the 
population of 331 million, it is a fair assumption that there are 250 million people in the US 
who regularly eat chicken. It might be more, but the exact number does not matter here. Taking 
into account that some of chicken who is in the US will be exported or fed to pets, on average, 
it is fair to assume that each of the people who regularly eat chicken eat 25 chickens per year. 
Now, it is obvious that if 250 million people would stop buying and eating chicken, the industry 
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would have to react by breeding and killing fewer animals.13 That would be approximately 6.25 
billion chickens that would not be slaughtered each year. However, as Norcross points out, the 
likelihood is, that the chicken industry would have to react sooner. The exact point is unknown, 
but it could be 10,000 people. For every 10,000 people that stops buying and eating chicken, 
the industry needs to breed and slaughter 250,000 fewer chickens per year.  
Now, since 1998, the demand for chicken meat has gone up in the U.S. However, if 
10,000 people can influence the market in a way that a quarter of a million fewer chickens are 
bred per year, that is still true, even if the demand in total has gone up. If instead of 8 billion 
chickens, 9 billion are being killed, there will still be a 250,000 difference, depending on 
whether 10,000 people buy chickens or not. Chickens are a good example here, because more 
individual chickens are killed than any other land animal combined. In 2018, out of the 9.59 
billion land animal that were slaughtered for food in the U.S, chickens made up 9 billion of 
those animals14. A partial explanation as to why most of the animals killed are chicken is 
because of their size. Chickens are a lot smaller than pigs and cows. In order to get 10 kg of 
chicken meat, more chickens have to killed in comparison to pigs and cows that would have to 
be killed in order to get 10 pounds of pig or cow.  
If there is a one in thousand chance that one’s individual purchase of a chicken will 
cause the industry to breed and kill an additional chicken, namely that one is the 10,000th person 
that stops buying chicken and helps to reach the threshold for the industry to breed and slaughter 
250,000 fewer chickens, the chance might seem small enough for the consumer not to care. 
However, if the harm that is risked is great enough, even a 1 in 1000 chance is big enough. For 
example, drinking or smoking even once during pregnancy is heavily disapproved, for the risks 
involved. We do disapprove heavily risks that might end up killing someone. (Norcross 2014, 
234) Now most people simply do not care too much about hypothetical chickens. When people 
see or hear about chickens suffering in poor conditions, they usually feel empathy. But if the 
chickens are hidden in factory farms, it is hard to empathize with them.   
Moreover, participating in and/or supporting a harmful action is wrong in itself, because 
we wrong the animals even if we do not change the outcome.  
 
13 Additionally, industries also depend on government or EU funded national financial aid. Still, 
even if at first, additional funding could help the industry or company to stay afloat, if there is 






In this chapter, I have provided a brief overview of as well as a defence for the 
abolitionist animal rights theory, focusing on Gary Francione and Tom Regan. Animal rights 
theory can be characterized as abolitionist, as it seeks to abolish the ways we humans use 
animals as mere means to our ends.  
Additionally, I introduced an alternative view to animal rights, which is the welfarist account. 
The welfarist approach is more commonly agreed with, as it focuses on the conditions in which 
animals are being kept and used, and not whether they are killed prematurely. The abolitionist 
is in favour of animals right not to be killed, whereas, to put it in rights terminology, it could 
be said that the welfarist focuses on animals’ right not to suffer. Welfarist account can be 
separated into old welfarist and new welfarist. The former care about the welfare of animals 
and the latter argue that we should use welfarist means to reach abolitionist goals. Robert Garner 
is an example of the latter kind. In the last section, I provided additional reasoning as to how 
an individual’s actions might have an impact on the animals and why we should be vegan, 





























Chapter 2: The practicality issue in the abolitionist animal rights framework 
In the last chapter I introduced the abolitionist animal rights framework as well as alternative 
framework. In this chapter I will look into the criticism of the abolitionist framework that 
mostly stems from Robert Garner.  Garner is an advocate of the welfarist approach, that I briefly 
went over in the last chapter. There are various ways in which to criticize the concept of animal 
rights as well as there are a multitude of ways in which to conceptualise which rights which 
animals should possess. The focus I want to take here, however, is the criticism against how 
the abolitionist animal rights approach is to be implemented. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the main way to implement abolitionist animal rights ideas into the world is through 
veganism15. Francione and many other abolitionists advocate for vegan education and for 
individuals becoming vegan. Vegan education primarily consists of informing people about 
animals and how they are being treated in the animal agriculture in an effort to make people 
think, empathize with the animals and to act in accordance with animal rights. The criticism I 
wish to undertake here can be organised into an impracticality argument. 
“The prohibition on using and killing animals is so far removed from contemporary 
reality throughout the world that it is clearly, at some level at least, an inadequate theory.“ 
(Garner 2016, 219).  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the topic of animal rights is a moral as well as a 
political issue. Moreover, it is a social movement. It is not just a theory. It is a theory that is to 
be implemented in the world. The goal is moral progress. The theory can help the political and 
the social movement. This is why we want animal rights to be practical, it is to be 
implementable in the world. According to Robert Garner, the dilemma is that, if the matter is 
of justice, we cannot rely on individuals alone. Changing one’s dietary habits for a vegan diet 
for self-less reasons is not very probable, especially in a world where the majority eats a non-
vegan diet. Yet, giving animals legal rights is also not going to happen overnight. Therefore, 
Garner proposes to focus on implementing changes on an institutional level that ensure better 
conditions for the animals in the animal agriculture. There are some aspects of his theory that I 
agree with – I will be using his idea of implementing a nonideal realm in ethics, however, moral 
 
15 Whilst veganism is most commonly associated with concern for animals, the practice of not 
eating any animal products addresses other concerns as well. People can choose to not eat 
animal products because they care about their health or the climate. 
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philosophy is primarily concerned with providing individual guidance. If a moral theory, for 
example utilitarianism, is about goodness or what to value, we can draw from it what the 
individual ought to do. For example, in preference utilitarianism, the satisfaction of preferences 
is of utmost importance. The more preferences are satisfied the better. So, what the individual 
ought to do, is to act in accordance with what most people prefer. But if we take Garner’s 
theory, the ethical demands on the individual will be not demanding enough.  
2.1 Is veganism as an ethical requirement too impractical? 
Most people have control over their diet. Those are the people who my paper concerns. 
For example, I will not be talking about cases where people are in poverty or are children in a 
difficult setting.  However, even if the people who have control over their diet can theoretically 
go vegan, i.e. stop consuming and buying animal products, they majority do not. Based on 
empirical evidence, despite the incline in the overall popularity of veganism, in the mainstream 
as well as in animal ethics, the majority of people are not vegan or even vegetarian. In fact, 
many people who were vegan, start consuming animals again. Whilst there is a major incline 
of new vegan products becoming more widely available, even companies as big as Ben & Jerry 
and McDonalds are serving vegan options, as a result of seeing the interest for vegan products. 
Vegans are still a tiny fraction of a society. This begs the following question: is veganism as an 
ethical requirement too much to ask from people? In a society where eating animal products is 
the norm, should ethics make more realistic requirements than complete abstinence?  
On the one hand, whether ethical requirements should be feasible to fulfil for most 
people is usually not taken to be an important factor. Ethics deals with what is right, not with 
what is convenient. On the other hand, we want ethical requirements to be fulfilled. Moreover, 
utilitarianism for example, has been frequently criticized for being too demanding of a moral 
theory if it demands that people ought to act in a way that maximizes utility at all times.16 Is 
there such a thing as too demanding ethical requirement? Philosophers such as Robert Garner, 
T. J. Kasperbauer and a few others, are of the option that yes.  
 
 
16 A moral theory and a moral requirement differ, but they are similar in the relevant sense, in that utilitarianism 
as a moral theory can be criticised for making too demanding requirements. Although to this it could be 
answered that utilitarianism is more useful when it comes to assessing things, and not so much as to demanding 




The conditional commonly used to defend the position according to which ethical 
requirements should not be too demanding is called the Ought Implies Can principle. According 
to the Ought Implies Can (OIC) principle, X can only be morally required to perform an act A 
if X is able to perform the act A. Kasperbauer was arguing in Subhuman: The Moral Psychology 
of Human Attitudes to Animals, that even if something is possible yet very unlikely to happen, 
we should not require such a thing from people. According to him, we should not have a moral 
requirement if we are not able to fulfil it. ‘Can’ in his context means ‘is able to in a relevant 
way’, instead of a possibility. It follows that for him, it is plausible to assume that one is unable 
to fulfil a moral requirement X if one is unable to motivate oneself to fulfil X. Now this is a 
rather strong reading of OIC. Should we accept this reading? One reason why we might want 
to accept the strong version of OIC has to do with usefulness.  
If people have trouble motivating themselves to be vegan, it could be argued that 
veganism as an ethical requirement is not particularly action-guiding or useful. If an ethical 
requirement is not useful enough, then perhaps there is something wrong with the ethical 
requirement. If ought implies can, and most cannot be vegan - in the relevant sense of the term, 
as Kasperbauer puts it - then ought they? If an ethical requirement is lacking capacity to guide 
action, it might not be useful.17 It is true that most people do not follow the ethical requirement 
of veganism. If people do not follow an ethical requirement, it might lack capacity to guide 
action. However, it might not. In the next section I will explain how it is not the case that if 
people do not follow an ethical requirement, the ethical requirement lacks action-guiding 
property. Idealistic ethical requirement can have practical value. 
 
2.2 How idealistic ethical requirements can be practical 
If ‘action-guidance’ means 'will inspire direct action' there is a danger of setting the bar 
for ethical requirements too low. If 'action-guiding' is defined by people's ability to will or 
motivate themselves to follow an action, the bar will be set rather high (Valentini 2009, 9). 
Would it have to inspire direct action from every person? For the majority of people? If ethical 
requirements only have to demand what humans are already likely to follow at time X, then 
moral progress will be more difficult. Animal ethics, being applied ethics, is normative, rather 
than descriptive. If animal ethics would prescribe requirements that people already follow, it 
could fall into the category of mere 'descriptive' and that is not what we want ethics to be.  
 
17 Walter Sinnot-Armstrong (1984) and Laura Valentini (2009) for example have mentioned a 
similar concern regarding the usefulness of ’ought’s and action-guiding capacity.  
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Furthermore, “idealistic” moral requirements give us a standard to which we can 
evaluate the current state (Estlund 2011, Regan 1983). If we do not know what is good, then 
how could we improve? Even if we will not be perfect, progress is still possible. If not 
consuming animals and animal products is an ethical requirement, taking any step towards it 
could be seen as the right thing to do. Perhaps when talking about these steps, one should 
formulate ought with keeping in mind what people can be likely to follow. But it does not mean 
that veganism should not be an ethical requirement. 
Additionally, direct and indirect action-guidance capacity of an ethical requirement can 
also be differentiated. For example, an indirect case of an action-guidance would be when the 
requirement provides a standard that inspires the agent to act in a way closer to the standard 
than they would have without the requirement, as mentioned in the previous section. (Lawford-
Smith 2010, Stern 2004).  
Moreover, human capabilities change. Just because something is unlikely in the present 
day, it does not mean that it will be unlikely in the future (Flanagan 1991, Gilabert, Lawford-
Smith 2012). Whilst it is unlikely that everyone will stop consuming animals tomorrow, in the 
future, it could happen. For example, at the beginning of the 19th century, it was very unlikely 
for China to get rid of the foot-binding practice. However, there were activists doing social 
campaigning and by the beginning of the 20th century, the practice was abolished. If we do not 
have ethical ideals toward which to strive, if nothing more is required than what is already 
happening, positive moral change would be hard to come by.  
Meanwhile, Kasperbauer’s reading of OIC is rather strong. David Estlund (2011) has 
argued against the strong notion of ‘can’ that Kasperbauer proposes, as just because someone 
cannot motivate themselves18 to fulfil X does not mean that they are not able to do X. By all 
means, they can fulfil X, they just do not, because of lack of will. This does not prove that they 
cannot do X, so there is no reason to accept an account of OIC where ‘can’ is bounded by the 
implication of ‘can will’. A more common reading of OIC such that Estlund (2011) gives is the 
following:  
A person is able to (can) do something if and only if, were she to try and not give up, she would 
tend to succeed.  
 
 
18 I will exclude cases where the lack of will to motivate oneself is due to a medical condition 
that hinders ones’ abilities such as clinical depression. 
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So, we have no reason to lower our standards for justice or, specifically, moral oughts. 
There are different constraints that can hinder what people are able to do. In political 
theorizing the constraints that factor can be put in the following categories: logical, physical, 
biological, economical, institutional, cultural, psychological, and motivational (Gilabert, 
Lawford-Smith 2012, 814). The same constraints play a role when assessing whether an ethical 
obligation is feasible or practicable. Additionally, constraints are either hard, i.e. constraints 
that will always exist and should be taken seriously, or soft, i.e. constraints that could cease to 
exist. Hard constraints that I think should be taken seriously, are logical and physical. For 
example, a person should not be obliged to live up to be 500 years old, even if they could do 
more good with the extra years (Panizza 2020, 5). Other constraints should be taken into 
account, but less so. A person should still be required not to kill another person, for example, 
even if their culture encourages it.19 
A relevant distinction to draw out here has to do with agent’s actions and whether the 
agent is to blame for why she is unable to something. If we could avoid moral requirements by 
simply putting ourselves into situations where we cannot fulfil moral requirements, it would be 
too easy to avoid moral requirements. For example, we blame drunk drivers if they get into 
traffic accidents, not because they could have acted differently behind the wheel and not hit 
something or someone, but because we hold them responsible for getting drunk, sitting behind 
the wheel and driving (Sinott-Armstrong 1984, 251). 
Another argument against OIC has to do with moral dilemmas. If X has requirements 
m1, m2, m3 … mn and X cannot fulfil them all, we would not say that some of the moral 
requirements fall away. If we were to not accept OIC, we could be able to say that one still has 
all of those moral requirements, yet one need not be blamed for not fulfilling all of them. The 
blameworthiness factor takes into account the circumstances in which one is in but rejecting 
the OIC allows the requirements to retain their moral requirement status, without being affected 







19 E.g. in the context of duelling with pistols in England in the late 18th century.  
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Chapter 3: Nonideal theory in the abolitionist animal rights framework 
So far, I have looked into whether veganism as an ethical requirement is too idealistic 
and whether it should not be an ethical requirement in our nonideal world or at least used as a 
main tactic in animal activists’ approach. I have concluded that ethical requirements should be 
idealistic, as ethical requirements can inspire action in a direct or indirect way, by providing a 
standard towards which to aspire. However, the disconnect from the real world has not been 
solved. In a way it does not have to be solved, but it would be beneficial to have it solved.  
As mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, Robert Garner has introduced a nonideal 
approach to animal ethics, as a way of making ethical requirements more realistic. However, 
his ideal theory as well as his nonideal theory are flawed in my opinion. In this chapter, I will 
introduce the nonideal-ideal distinction, go over Garner’s interpretation of it and present the 
case for my interpretation for the ideal and nonideal theory in animal ethics.  
Nonideal theory is a response to the nonideal circumstances of the world. Similar to 
John Rawls’ nonideal theory, I will argue that secondary requirements will be helpful in 
assisting to reach the ideal ethical demands (Rawls 1971, 245). Whilst most discussions on 
ideal and nonideal theories focus on the concept of justice20 and in the abolitionist animal rights 
theory issues in animal ethics are issues of justice, I will implement it on normative claims in 
general, and more specifically one claim about veganism being a positive moral obligation.   
3.1 Robert Garner’s ideal and nonideal theory distinction in animal ethics 
In ethics, the ideal and nonideal debate has yet to receive enough attention (López 
2017). Nonideal theory has been seen as a more realistic and pragmatic approach, in contrast to 
ideal theory which is, as its name suggests, an idealistic, perhaps even utopian approach to 
normative theory in political philosophy or in moral philosophy. In ideal theory, two kinds of 
idealizing assumptions are made about its subject. First, it is assumed that all citizens or 
societies are largely cooperative and willing to follow the rules. (Tessmann 2014, 808) Second 
assumption regards the conditions of a society, which make it easier for citizens or societies to 
be cooperative. For example, the citizens are not starving, but rather they are able to think about 
moral issues. (López 2017) In a Rawlsian fashion, Garner identifies the most prominent issue 
that animals are currently facing: the suffering (2016, 226-227). Garner has differentiated 




animal lives are only allowed to be sacrificed for human interest when the human interests are 
significant (2016, 225) However, he barely mentions this in other works (2010), so it seems 
what is important for him is that animals should not suffer. Most people would agree with this, 
so it seems like it would be easier to implement in the real life, which is something that he 
values in theory. What is problematic though is that the new welfarist position, in nonideal 
theory, that is, predominantly says nothing about killing animals. At the same time, in practice, 
in order for an animal to be killed, they tend to have to suffer. So if we put this in practice, 
perhaps Garner’s as well as abolitionist animal rights position would be in agreement that we 
should be vegan, as it is quite hard to obtain animal products that come from animals that did 
not suffer in their lifetime, suffering being either killed prematurely and/or have non-decent 
living conditions. However, it is still problematic that Garner does not put importance on the 
killing aspect. He accepts that animals’ interest in not suffering is the same as humans’ interest 
in not suffering. But he does not accept that humans’ interest in continued life is the same as 
animals’ interest in continued life (2016, 224-225). Of course, there are some differences, such 
as humans might have plans that they have talked about with other humans, and we have limited 
understanding of nonhuman animal cognition. However, especially given that the interest in 
avoiding suffering is the same, there is no basis for arguing that interest in life differs in a 
morally significant way when it comes to weighing human interest with animal interests. If we 
want to be consistent, we should accept either neither or both. Given that it is hard to accept 
that animals are not interested in avoiding suffering or as interested in avoiding suffering as 
humans, we should accept both.  
Garner’s nonideal theory focuses on suffering in order to be more practical. However, 
if we examine what individual guidance it provides to the individual, then it is not demanding 
enough. For example, if we would have to prefer eggs from “happy chickens” then we would 
have problems actually finding eggs that come from “happy chickens”, even when they are 
labelled as such. In this way it is not demanding enough and it does not offer adequate individual 
guidance. There is strong evidence to suggest that most animal products are produced in a way 
that the animals have to endure horrible conditions throughout their unnaturally short lives and 
their transportation to the slaughterhouses. Whilst there are some options of eggs on the market 
that come from a local farm, where the chickens have decent welfare granted to them, the 
majority of the eggs are not from “happy” chickens. In the political realm, I see some merit in 
Garner’s theory. But in animal ethics, in moral philosophy, ethics needs to provide the 
individual with action-guidance. If we would take Garner’s nonideal theory and out – it would 
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not be enough. It would not offer relevant individual guidance nor would it be better at 
evaluating actions of the individuals. 
Moreover, regulating the use of animals can justify the use of animals. If consumers are 
led to believe that think that buying eggs from cage-free chickens is ethical, it might be 
misleading. Whilst buying eggs that came from a cage-free chicken is possibly less unethical 
than buying eggs laid by a battery-caged chicken, the difference might be minute (Francione 
2010). In reality, the welfare of chickens is not necessarily improved in a cage-less system. 
Without a cage, chickens could have more room to spread their wings, better floor to potentially 
nest and be more comfortable than standing constantly on wire floor, no sunshine etc. However, 
if the cage-free area is packed with chickens, they will not have adequate space. A few of the 
additional problems are the following: it’s more difficult to keep the space clean, rather than 
the cages clean, there’s a higher risk for cannibalism from being deprived from chance to live 
in a natural space and to exhibit natural behaviour.21 Therefore, I am sceptical to some aspects 
of Garner’s position I do agree that it can be possible to relieve some of the animal suffering 
by regulation. However, it is important to make note that making a cage bigger does not mean 
that the cage’s existence is ethical. A bigger cage is less unethical than a smaller cage. But the 
bigger cage is still unethical. On the one hand, regulation might lead to abolition, as Garner has 
argued. For example, in Germany and Japan, mink farms have closed due to demanding 
regulations that are put in place to ensure the welfare of minks.22 However, this does not ensure 
that the practice will not spark up again. Moreover, a strong role was played by the consumers, 
rather than regulation. 
Whilst Garner suggests than we should focus on the welfare of the animals and not on 
abolishing the current practices, as a more reliable method of working in the interests in the 
animals, I think that we need both, working on regulations that improve the conditions as well 
as abolishing as many practices as possible involving the misuse of animals. At time same time, 
we need to be critical of the way that animals’ welfare is regulated and whether it actually 
benefits animals or not.  
 
 
21 Hartcher, K.M., and B. Jones. “The Welfare of Layer Hens in Cage and Cage-Free Housing 





3.2 Alternative nonideal theory in animal ethics: secondary requirements and a 
scalar approach to wrongness  
In this section, after rejecting Garner’s interpretation of nonideal realm in animal ethics 
in the previous section, I will now introduce my own version of the nonideal realm in animal 
ethics that is in accordance with the abolitionist animal rights framework. Whilst we might not 
have to solely focus on animal suffering, in order to deal with the problem that animals are 
suffering and killed without a good enough reason, we can still use the idea of nonideal theory 
regarding animal ethics. I will argue in favour of the notion of secondary requirements which 
in a similar fashion to nonideal theory, will help us to implement ethics in the world. Borrowing 
this concept is an apt response to the imperfect conditions of the world and moral agents. Just 
because it is not easy to fulfil ethical requirements does not mean that we should not try and 
lower our standards. However, if we want moral progress to happen most efficiently and to be 
able to describe the moral progress in optimific way, ‘secondary requirements’23 can be of use.  
Moreover, in order to assess the secondary requirements as well as the current state of affairs 
and the moral progress that is happening, I think it is optimific to use scalar way of thinking 
about ethics, in addition to the notions of right and wrong. In this way, we can have the ideal – 
which is to not use animals as means at all, but we can still talk about small improvements, 
whether it is on the level of the individual consumer behaviour or industry regulation.  
First, secondary requirements can be seen as something that arises when the individual 
fails to comply with the first order requirements. For example, if Chang has promised to meet 
Brown, he ought to meet Brown (requirement 1). If it turns out that he cannot, he ought to call 
Brown to let him know that he cannot meet him (requirement 2). If he cannot call, he ought to 
ask for someone else’s phone to be able to call to Brown, or find a way to be able to let Brown 
know in some other way. It is not the case that he no longer ought to meet Brown, but since he 
cannot, the secondary requirement arises. With veganism, it is slightly different, but similar 
enough. For Chang, a new requirement turned up when the first was no longer possible. (Sinott-
Armstrong 1984, 257-258). With veganism, if one cannot, as in cannot will themselves to give 
up the consumption of animal products all of the time, one ought to start with eating less of 
animal products and more plant-based products, as it is easier to focus on the positive obligation 
rather than what one ought not to do. For Rawls, secondary requirements (‘nonideal theory’ or 
 
23 W. Sinott-Armstrong for example named what I call ‘secondary requirements’, ‘secondary 
obligations’ but I will use the term requirement to mean the same as ‘obligation’ throughout 
this thesis. 
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‘non-compliancy theory’ as he words it) are secondary to ‘ideal theory’ or ethical claims as I 
argue in this thesis. First, we need general principles of what is right, then we can assess 
individual actions. Why is eating fewer animal products good? Because in order for someone 
to be able to eat animal products, animals will generally have to be killed and harmed without 
a good enough reason.  
There is a risk that secondary requirements will overshadow the first requirements, 
making people not pay attention to them. By asking only reducing one’s meat and animal 
product consumption, rather than refraining from it completely, it might imply that mere 
reducing is morally unproblematic. Killing animals for unnecessary reasons is wrong. 
Supporting killing animals for food is wrong. It is wrong to support killing animals once a week 
and it is wrong to support killing animals every day. However, this is just something to be aware 
of and not something to the detriment of the secondary requirements. Moreover, reducing one’s 
meat consumption is not wrong. Reducitarianism, a diet committed to reducing one’s meat 
consumption, insofar as it still contains eating meat, is not ethical per se. But it is less unethical 
than eating predominantly meat.  
Now I will move onto the scalar way of assessing the secondary requirements as well 
as general actions of individuals and societies. The concepts of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are very 
much intertwined in our everyday thought and talk as well as are fundamental in the realm of 
moral philosophy. Traditionally, in the two major frameworks in ethics and especially in animal 
ethics24, in utilitarianism as well as in deontological tradition of thought, the value of actions is 
conceptualized in terms of right and wrong. In utilitarianism, the objective is to promote as 
much good or utility as possible, but the way it is evaluated is not scalar. An action is right if it 
is good and an action is wrong if it is bad. Some right actions produce more good, some less. 
But two actions are not compared in terms of ‘more ethical’ or ‘less ethical’. To better evaluate 
moral progress, it makes more sense to employ a scalar way of thinking about rightness. A 
purely scalar way of talking about ethics has been seen as problematic when things are clearly 
either wrong or right. (Norcross 2016, 217).  However, in my opinion, we can employ the scalar 
 
24 Utilitarian Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation (1975) and deontologist Tom Regan’s The Case 
for Animal Rights (1983) have been the most influential works in the area of animal ethics that 
are still shaping the current debates, although virtue ethics and care ethics frameworks are 
contributing to the field in valuable ways as well, e.g. see Hursthouse, Rosalind. (2011) "Virtue 
ethics and the treatment of animals." The Oxford handbook of animal ethics. 119-143. 
And Donovan, Josephine, and Carol J. Adams. (1996). "Beyond animal rights: A feminist 
caring ethic for the treatment of animals."  
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approach also when there is the notion of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Some things can be more or less 
wrong. So, in order to better evaluate people’s actions as well as moral progress, it is optimal 
to employ a scalar way of thinking about morality in addition to the notions ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
(Brown 2016). 
When things are clearly either wrong or right, for example, when it comes to the 
example of killing, we usually don’t need the notions of ‘less wrong’ or ‘more wrong’ and we 
just stick to the notion that killing is wrong. If a serial killer A kills 10 children, and serial killer 
B kills 6 children, there is not such a need to say that both serial killers committed acts that 
were morally wrong, but serial killer B ‘s acts were less unethical, although still unethical. A 
judge might only need to evaluate the wrong actions on a scale in order to give out the 
punishment that fits the crime, but ordinarily what counts is that both people did morally wrong 
things, i.e. they both killed people.  However, killing animals for food and supporting such an 
industry that kills animals for food is more commonly accepted as well as more common in our 
society. Most people do not consider the killing part morally wrong, even if it is for a 
nonessential reason. In this case, it makes sense to evaluate on a scalar way. Killing animals for 
food when one is able to flourish without killing animals for food is morally wrong. Not killing 
animals for a nonessential reason is morally right. However, because moral progress is slow to 
take place, the issue of eating animals is a complex one involving many intricacies such as long 
traditions as well as people’s health, people are not easily convinced that they do not need to 
eat meat or other animal products. The issue is too complex to be discussed in full detail in this 
thesis. However, the complexity of the issue of why people continue eating animal products 
suggests that it is optimific to evaluate the moral progress and peoples’ actions involving the 
use of animals for food in a wider way than merely ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. For example, this 
framework would allow us to say that not eating meat one day per week is less unethical than 
eating meat every day.  
 
3.3 Criticism against ideal theory 
When talking about nonideal theory, it is important to look into the ideal theory as well. 
A common argument against the Rawlsian justification of the ideal theory that I brought out in 
the last paragraph is that in truth, we do not always need the perfect account of justice in order 
to assess that action x was more just than action y. Moreover, we can favour x even if it is not 
in accordance with perfect account of justice. I agree with this criticism. I think we do need first 
order requirements at least in spirit of the ideal theory, otherwise we would have to completely 
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rely on intuitive judgement. This would be problematic, because not everyone shares the same 
intuitive judgements, so they cannot be a reliable source of truth. We might not need a detailed 
account of ‘good’ or how we ought to treat every kind of animal, in order to assess that one 
action of ours was better than another, but we still need some idealistic principles.  
To further answer this even further, I will explain how veganism can even be understood 
as a nonideal theory. It could be argued that veganism as an ethical requirement is already 
accustomed to the real-world constraints. On the one hand, it seeks to end the use of animal 
products, from our meals, as well as from the products we use - whilst I am focusing on the 
food aspect, and plant-based diet could be separated from veganism as the worldview, veganism 
is about not using animals as means.  
 
The Vegan Society (TVS) has defined veganism in the following way: 
 
"Veganism is a philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude—as far as is 
possible and practicable—all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, 
clothing or any other purpose; and by extension, promotes the development and use of 
animal-free alternatives for the benefit of animals, humans and the environment. In 
dietary terms it denotes the practice of dispensing with all products derived wholly or 
partly from animals."25  
 
In 2015 the last sentence was not included in the definition that TVS has on their 
webpage. There is definitely a debate whether veganism should be about diet or beliefs as well 
as diet (Dutkiewicz & Dickstein 2021). Although the term ‘veganism’ has always been 
connected to the belief that it is morally wrong to use animals merely as means (Watson 1944), 
because food or other inanimate objects are labelled as ‘vegan’ or ‘not vegan’, and inanimate 
objects cannot have beliefs, the term necessarily is connected to something other than 
beliefs. But what is worthwhile to note in that definition is in the beginning of it : “Veganism 
is a philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude—as far as is possible and 
practicable—all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other 
purpose.” [emphasis added] What is usually meant by this, is that foods that come in a package 
that says the following: “May contain eggs, dairy” (or some other animal derived substance), 
are still vegan. What this means is that the food is produced or packaged in a factory where also 
 
25 https://www.vegansociety.com/go-vegan/definition-veganism (As of 27.04.2021)  
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non-vegan foods are produced and therefore it is possible, yet very unlikely, that some small 
particles travel in the air or have been left in the machines. For people with life-threatening 
allergy, it makes sense to pay attention to these warnings, as even a tiny particle could be 
detrimental to their health. But for vegans living in non-vegan world, it is difficult to avoid 
products that do not come with this warning, and the likelihood is so little that it is not 
considered a non-vegan product, just because it is produced in close proximity to products that 
contain some dairy.  
Secondly, the majority of medicine has been tested on animals as well as may contain 
some animal-derived substance. The ideal would be to not test products on animals and to have 
medicine that contains synthetic substitute rather than animal-derived substance. Usually the 
animal-derived part such as lactose or gelatine is not the active ingredient - the ingredient that 
has an effect on the patient’s health. Rather lactose and gelatine - to name a few - are used in 
pills as a binder or filler, so they could be substituted for synthetic binders and fillers. However, 
if there is no substitute on the market yet, it is difficult to say that it is ethically problematic to 
sacrifice own’s life. For example, some active ingredients are animal derived (e.g. heparin) and 
the synthetic contains more risks - in this case we could say that it is a moral dilemma. The pig 
whose intestinal mucous membrane was turned into blood thinner called heparin was wronged. 
However, using another type of blood thinner could have been fatal for the patient. So, for 24 
hours, he prioritized his own life and used pig-derived blood thinners. 
If someone is truly unable to access a vegan a diet, they would not be expected to starve 
for the sake of animals. The general point is, one is not expected to sacrifice one’s life in favour 
of animals’ lives. The rules are not set to stone, which makes this difficult to analyse in a 
philosophical thesis, but it is nonetheless worth mentioning that veganism can be and in fact 
usually is regarded as a nonideal solution to the issue of us using animals as mere means. Even 
if veganism can be seen as a nonideal theory, as something approachable, as it currently stands, 
it is more commonly seen as something non-approachable.  
 
However, as I have argued in this chapter, we can have additional secondary 
requirements which are further explained by a scalar approach to wrongness. This approach can 
help to assess the current state of society and the actions of the individuals in a more exact way 






The main critique that I have argued against in this thesis is the claim that abolitionist 
animal rights is too unrealistic of a theory and therefore it is impractical. Rather than going 
through every possible aspect and implication of the animal rights theory, I chose to mainly 
focus my attention on one aspect of the theory that supposedly makes it unrealistic, which is 
the abolishment of our practice of eating animals and their by-products.  
I am differentiating between micro and macro level of the animal rights theory, using Gary L. 
Francione’s categorisation of ideal, micro and macro level of a normative theory.  
The first chapter of the thesis I introduced the ideal level of the theory, which is abolitionist 
animal rights theory. 
In the second chapter, I examined the criticism against abolitionist animal rights theory 
on the micro level and whether veganism as an ethical requirement is too unrealistic. I argued 
that it is not too unrealistic, as idealistic ethical requirements have important practical value by 
providing ideal towards which to strive.  
In the third chapter I made the ideal nonideal distinction. First, I examined Robert 
Garner’s approach, according to which we should focus on the most urgent matter when it 
comes to our treatment of animal. He favours an approach which focuses on alleviating animal 
suffering that is caused by humans. Whilst this is certainly important, the killing aspect is no 
less important. Therefore, I examined some criticism against Garner’s approach, whether 
improving just the welfare of animals can be misleading and whether it can be of assistance 
towards the ideal. Instead of Robert Garner’s approach to nonideal animal ethics which focuses 
solely on animal suffering, I introduced the notion of secondary ethical requirements in the 
spirit of a nonideal theory. To further explain the secondary ethical requirements, I also 
introduced a scalar approach to morality, which is often associated with scalar utilitarianism, 
but can be applied in this context with deontological ideals. We can assess the moral progress 
on a wider scale than just ‘right’ (or ‘ethical’) and ‘wrong’ (or ‘unethical’), that is with terms 
‘less wrong’ (or ‘less unethical’) whilst maintaining the notions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Garner’s 
approach takes away the ideal, in this case, veganism, the abolishment of the practice of eating 
animals. Secondary requirements allow us to keep better track of moral progress by having a 
scalar way to ethics in addition to the concepts ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. There are a variety of 
options, some of which are better than others, some worse than others. Even if an option is not 
right, it is better and more ethical to choose the option that is closer to the ‘right’ on the scale 
of ethics than to ‘wrong’. For example, buying meat from a small farm, where the conditions 
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are better for the animal than in a big factory farm, is more ethical, even though it is important 


































In this thesis I have looked into the conflict between the abolitionist animal rights 
approach and the welfarist approach. The welfarists focus on animals’ right to not suffer, whilst 
the abolitionists recognize the animals’ right to life and that the root issue of animal suffering 
is their exploitation, predominantly in animal agriculture. The main way to implement 
abolitionist ideas into the real life is through veganism – the practice of abstaining from the use 
of animals in food as well as other areas of life. In the second chapter I looked into the criticism 
towards the abolitionist approach, according to which veganism as an ethical requirement is too 
demanding and unrealistic. I then explained how ethical requirements such as veganism 
sometimes have to be demanding yet can still have practical value by providing an ideal. In the 
third chapter I proposed a nonideal approach, according to which we ought to eat less meat as 
per secondary requirements. I also introduced a scalar approach to wrongness. This theoretical 
framework recognizes that some acts are more wrong than others, for example eating more 
meat is more wrong than eating less meat, yet we can maintain the ideal that eating meat still 




















Pealkiri: Vastus praktilisuse probleemile abolitsionistlikus loomaõiguste raamistikus: 
skalaarne mitteideaalne käsitlus 
 
Antud magistritöös oli vaatluse all abolitsionistliku loomaõiguste raamistiku ja loomade 
heaolul põhineva “loomaõiguste” raamistiku konflikt. Mõlemad lähenemised peavad oluliseks 
loomade õigusi, kuid loomade heaolule keskenduv raamistik põhineb loomade moraalsel 
õigusel mitte kannatada. Abolitsionistlik raamistik paneb suuremat rõhku sellele, et 
loomatööstuses on pea võimatu loomadele kannatusi mitte tekitada, loomade tapmine on vale 
ja loomade kannatuste juurpõhjuseks. Esimeses peatükis tutvustangi mõlemat lähenemist ning 
veganlust ehk täistaimset toitumist ja loomsete toodete mitteostmist, mis on abolitsionistliku 
raamistikust tulenev praktiline eetiline nõue. Teises peatükis uurin loomade heaolule 
keskenduva raamistiku kriitikat abolitsionistlikule raamistikule, mille kohaselt on 
abolitsionistlik lähenemine ja veganlus eetilise nõudena tänapäeva maailmas liiga nõudlik ja 
ebapraktiline. Argumenteerin, et veganlus võib olla nõudlik eetiline nõue, kuid eetilised nõuded 
peavadki vahepeal olema nõudlikud ning peale selle on neil ka praktiline väärtus, näiteks ideaali 
kujutlemisel. 
Samas, et balansseerida abolitsionistlikku käsitlust tänapäeva kontekstis, kus 
lihasöömine on väga levinud nähtus tutvustan kolmandas peatükis mitteideaalse lähenemisena 
sekundaarseid eetilisi nõudeid, mille kohaselt peame sööma vähem liha. Selgitan sekundaarseid 
nõuded skalaarse lähenemisega, mis lähtub printsiibist, et teod võivad olla vähem või rohkem 
mitte-eetilised. Kui vaatleme liha söömist siis saame kujutada skaalat, kus ’õige’ on liha mitte 
süüa, ’vale’ on süüa liha, samaaegselt saame paigutada liha rohke söömise ’rohkem valeks’, ja 
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